We present an OLG model in which life expectancy and environmental quality dynamics are jointly determined. Agents may invest in environmental care, depending on how much they expect to live. In turn, environmental conditions affect life expectancy. As a result, our model produces a positive correlation between longevity and environmental quality, both in the long-run and along the transition path. Eventually, multiple equilibria may also arise: some countries might be caught in a low-life-expectancy / low-environmental-quality trap. This outcome is consistent with stylized facts relating life expectancy and environmental performance measures. We also discuss the welfare and policy implications of the intergenerational externalities generated by individual choices. Finally, we show that our results are robust to the introduction of growth dynamics based on physical or human capital accumulation. JEL classification: J24; O11; O40; Q56.
Introduction
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Of course, the causal link between life expectancy and environmental quality may also go the other way around. Several studies in medicine and epidemiology, like Elo and Preston (1992) , Pope (2000) , Pope et al. (2004) and Evans and Smith (2005) , show that environmental quality is a very important factor affecting health and morbidity: air and water pollution, depletion of natural resources, soils deterioration and the like, are all capable of increasing human mortality (thus reducing longevity).
Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that, as we will show extensively later on, life expectancy is positively correlated across countries with environmental quality. In addition, the data suggest the existence of "convergence clubs" in terms of both environmental performance and longevity, with countries being concentrated around two levels of environmental quality and life expectancy, respectively. This paper provides a theoretical framework that allows us to reproduce the stylized facts highlighted above. To do that, we model explicitly the two-way causality between the environment and longevity, which generates a positive dynamic correlation between the two variables. This kind of interaction, which is central to our analysis, might in turn also justify the existence of an environmental poverty trap, characterized by both bad environmental conditions and short life expectancy. Moreover, we are able to identify inter-generational externalities, and study how they might be corrected by policy intervention.
In the benchmark version of our model, we consider overlapping generations of three-period lived agents, who get utility from consumption and environmental quality. During adulthood, when all relevant decisions are taken, they can work and allocate their income between consumption and investment in environmental maintenance: consumption involves deterioration of the future quality of the environment (through pollution and/or resource depletion), while maintenance helps to improve it. A key ingredient of our setting is that survival until the last period is probabilistic, and depends on the inherited quality of the environment. In turn, this survival probability affects the weight of future environmental quality in the agents' utility function. The idea that agents take utility from the future state of the environment is compatible with both self-interest and altruism towards future generations.
It can be shown that optimal choices depend crucially on life expectancy: a higher probability to be alive in the third period boosts investment in the environment and reduces consumption (the latter translating into less environmental deterioration). Since longevity is in turn affected by environmental conditions, the resulting two-sided feedback produces a positive correlation between the two variables, both at the steady-state and along the transition path.
Depending on the shape of the survival probability function, our model can also allow for multiple equilibria and may explain the existence of poverty traps: initial conditions do matter and a given economy may be caught in a high-mortality/poor-environment trap. In particular, we build an example based on a convex-concave function linking environmental quality and life expectancy, which is backed up by some well-established scientific literature (see Cakmak et al. (1999) and Scheffer et al. (2001) ). Possible strategies to escape from the trap will be also identified and discussed.
After analyzing the welfare and policy implications of our benchmark model, we introduce human capital accumulation so as to deal with endogenous income dynamics. Parents can use their income to also educate their children, while survival probabilities are affected by both environmental quality and education. Considering human capital led growth, we are able to see that the positive dynamic correlation between life expectancy and the environment still holds, and extends to income in the long-run. However, we also find that short-run deviations, which allow the environment to worsen as income increases, are possible. Under proper conditions, we may eventually end up with multiple development regimes, where the low-life-expectancy/poorenvironment trap is now characterized by low human capital as well.
Our model is primarily related to those papers that have analyzed environmental issues in a dynamic OLG framework. Among them, John and Pecchenino (1994) deal with environmental maintenance as an inter-generational problem, but life expectancy is assumed to be exogenous and plays no role in their model. The idea of explaining environmental care with an uncertain lifetime is instead present in Ono and Maeda (2001) , although in their model environmental quality does not affect longevity. On the contrary, Jouvet et al. (2007) consider the impact of environmental quality on mortality, but neglect completely the role of life expectancy in defining environmental choices and leave no room for maintenance. Our model is also somewhat related to Jouvet et al. (2000) , who use inter-generational altruism to explain environmental choices.
Let us also point out that, although environmental poverty traps have been already studied by John and Pecchenino (1994) and Ikefuji and Horii (2007) , these papers overlook the role of life expectancy, which in contrast we consider as being a crucial factor behind the existence of multiple equilibria. In this respect, our paper is related to Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) , or Chakraborty (2004) , in which life expectancy is regarded as a possible cause of underdevelopment traps (although not linked to the environment).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts on environmental quality and life expectancy that provide the motivation of our study. Section 3 introduces and solves the basic model, discussing its dynamic properties and welfare implications. An extended version of the model, allowing for human capital accumulation, is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Stylized facts
Here we want to present the stylized facts that motivate our analysis and will be matched by the main results of our theoretical model.
As a proxy for environmental quality, we use a newly available indicator: the Environmental Performance Index (henceforth EPI). This synthetic indicator (YCELP, 2006) takes into account both "environmental health", as defined by child mortality, indoor air pollution, drinking water, adequate sanitation and urban particulates, and "ecosystem vitality", which includes factors like air quality, water and productive natural resources, biodiversity and sustainable energy. In the end, the EPI is computed as a weighted average of 16 sub-indicators, each one converted to a proximity-to-target measure with a theoretical range of 0 to 100. Therefore, the EPI itself can ideally take values in the 0-100 range and, clearly enough, reducing pollution or preserving natural resources may both contribute to improve environmental quality. Using the EPI allows us to avoid a myopic view of environmental quality, according to which environmental degradation can be traced back only to industrial activity and pollution. In fact, poor environmental quality can also be explained by factors like mismanagement of natural resources, deforestation, overgrazing, unsanitary practices, etc. 1 Since child mortality is, obviously, strongly correlated with life expectancy, in the rest of the paper we employ an amended version of the original EPI, which is obtained removing the child mortality factor. 2 Life expectancy is measured using "life expectancy at birth" (2005), from United Nations 1 Countries with a comparable EPI level may exhibit very different sub-indicators scores. Take for instance United States, Russia and Brazil, that are ranked 28, 32 and 34 respectively, with an EPI ranging from 78.5 to 77. The United States rank very high in environmental health, but very low in the management of natural resources. Russia displays excellent resource indicators, while failing to achieve decent scores in sustainable energy. Finally, Brazil does well in water quality, but is characterized by extremely low biodiversity indicators. See YCELP (2006) for further examples. 2 Child mortality accounted for 10.5% of the total EPI.
(2007) data. Data on environmental quality and life expectancy are simultaneously available for a sample of 132 countries; they allow us to observe a couple of stylized facts.
Stylized fact 1 Across countries, environmental quality is positively correlated with life expectancy.
As reported in Figure 1 , for our cross-section of 132 countries there is strong evidence supporting the idea that longevity and environmental quality are linked; in particular, the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.66 and statistically significant at the 1% level. The graph below is compatible with the hypothesis of a two-way causality between the two variables. In addition, a second kind of stylized fact is particularly interesting.
Stylized fact 2 Environmental quality and life expectancy are bimodally distributed across countries.
Therefore, the data suggest the possibility of an environmental poverty trap, characterized also by short life expectancy. This concept points to the existence of "convergence clubs" in terms of environmental performance and longevity: countries are concentrated around two levels of the EPI and life expectancy. In fact Figure 2 , depicting histograms and kernel density estimates (with optimal bandwidth), displays bimodal distributions of both variables across countries. 3 3 In both cases, the null hypothesis of unimodality is rejected by the Hartigan's dip test, which measures the maximum difference, over all sample points, between the empirical distribution function, and the unimodal distribution function that minimizes the maximum difference. Accordingly, we calculate the dip test statistic (d). For our EPI data, We believe that this double bimodality can be interpreted as a trap, since there is a high degree of overlap in the lower modes of the two distributions represented in Figure 2 . For instance, out of the 48 countries in the lower mode of the life expectancy distribution (less than 58 years), only one shows up in the upper mode of the EPI distribution (EPI score larger than 62). Moreover, if
we divide both distributions into two groups of equal size, we find that (i) out of 66 countries with a EPI index lower than the median value (56.04), 54 also belong to the group characterized by a life expectancy below the median (69.5), and (ii) out of the 66 countries with lower-thanmedian life expectancy, 55 also exhibit a below-the-median value of the EPI.
Among "trapped" economies we find, together with African countries, the vast majority of ex- the computed value of d is 0.0385. As it can be inferred from Hartigan and Hartigan (1985) , in the case of our sample size (132 observations), the null hypothesis of unimodality is rejected because d > 0.0370 (at the 5% significance level). The same applies to life expectancy: on the basis of our data, since d = 0.036, the Hartigan's dip test allows us to reject the null hypothesis of unimodality at the 10% significance level.
The benchmark model
We start by setting up a simple model where agents allocate their income between current consumption and environmental maintenance. Consumption, generating pollution and/or increasing pressure on natural resources, involves some degradation of environmental quality. No growth mechanism is considered.
Structure of the model
We consider an infinite-horizon economy that is populated by overlapping generations of agents living for three periods: childhood, adulthood, and old age. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ..., ∞. All decisions are taken in the adult period of life. Individuals live safely through the first two periods, while survival to the third period is subject to uncertainty. We assume no population growth. Furthermore, agents are considered to be identical within each generation, whose size is normalized to one (in the first two periods). Preferences are represented by a utility function U t (c t , e t+1 ), such that
and lim e t+1 →0 ∂U t (·)/∂e t+1 = +∞. In particular, in order to get closed-form solutions, we assume:
People care about adult consumption (c t ) and environmental quality when old (e t+1 ); γ > 0 represents the weight agents give to the future environment (green preferences), while π t denotes the survival probability, which is taken as given since it depends on inherited environmental quality. Here, for the sake of simplicity, we abstract from time discounting so that the subjective preference for the future is entirely determined by π t γ. Notice also that, in our framework, an increase (decrease) in the survival probability translates into a higher (lower) life expectancy, so that hereafter we will use the two concepts interchangeably.
Let us underline that e t may encompass both environmental conditions (quality of water, air and soils, etc.) and resources availability (biodiversity, forestry, fisheries, etc.). 4 Broadly speaking, e t can be seen as an index of the amenity (use and non-use) value of the environment.
Adult individuals face the following budget constraint:
they allocate their income (w t ) between consumption and environmental maintenance (m t ). In this benchmark version of our model, income is assumed to be exogenous. 5 Environmental maintenance summarizes all the actions that agents can take in order to preserve and improve environmental conditions.
Following John and Pecchenino (1994) , the law of motion of environmental quality is given by the following expression:
with β, σ, λ > 0 and 0 < η < 1.
The parameter η is the natural rate of deterioration of the environment, σ represents the effectiveness of maintenance, whereas β accounts for the degradation of the environment, or pollution, due to each unit of consumption. The above formulation also allows for the possibility of exogenous external effects on the environment: λQ t > 0 (< 0) represents the total impact of a harmful (beneficial) activity. 6 Notice that a reduction in c t has a double effect on the environment: it directly affects environmental quality through β (alleviating the pressure on natural resources and/or reducing pollution), and frees resources for maintenance (relaxing the budget constraint). Moreover, equation (3) implies that agents cannot, through their actions, modify the current state of the environment e t : the latter is thus inherited, depending only on the past generation's choices. 7 
Optimal choices
Taking as given w t , e t and π t , agents choose c t and m t so as to maximize U t (c t , e t+1 ) subject to (2), (3), c t > 0, m t > 0 and e t > 0. With a general utility function, the optimality condition writes as:
Using equation (1), optimal choices are then given by:
5 This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4, where we allow for human capital accumulation and consequent income dynamics. 6 Natural disasters or episodes of acute pollution, like oil slicks or the Chernobyl accident, can be typical examples of Q t > 0, while the implementation of an international agreement that promotes a worldwide reduction of pollutants (i.e. the Kyoto Protocol) or the preservation of the Amazonian forest could be regarded as a negative Q t in our model. 7 Therefore, our results would not change if we introduce current environmental quality e t in the utility function.
and
Notice that here, given that agents are identical and the population is normalized to one, aggregate variables are completely equivalent to individual ones. Therefore, all variables in our model can be also easily interpreted as "country" variables.
From (5) and (6), we can observe that both consumption and environmental maintenance are positively affected by income: richer economies are more likely to invest in environmental care.
In addition, current environmental quality has a positive effect on consumption, but a negative one on maintenance: investments in maintenance are less needed if the inherited environment is less degraded. These two results have already been established by John and Pecchenino (1994) .
The novelty of our model is that we can identify a specific effect of life expectancy (as determined by the survival probability π t ) on environmental maintenance. As it can be easily seen from the following derivative
which is positive for interior solutions, a higher survival probability induces more maintenance, since it raises stronger concerns for the future state of the environment. This paves the way for a positive correlation between longevity and environmental quality, along the transition path.
In addition, a relatively larger value of Q t requires more investment in maintenance. Notice that the term (1 − η)e t − λQ t represents the net effect of past and external environmental conditions on optimal choices.
Dynamics
Once we substitute (5) and (6) into (3), we get the following dynamic difference equation, describing the evolution of environmental quality over time:
So far we have considered π t as exogenous, although we have pointed out that life expectancy may depend on (bequeathed) environmental quality. Now, we introduce explicitly a function π t = π (e t ), such that ∂π(e t )/∂e t > 0, lim e t → 0 π(e t ) = π and lim e t →∞ π(e t ) = π, with 0 < π < into survival probability such as, for instance, medicine effectiveness.
Let us underline that agents cannot improve their own survival probability by investing in maintenance. This is consistent with equation (3), where current environmental choices (especially m t ) affect the future state of the environment. Any investment in maintenance will be rewarded, in terms of environmental quality and life expectancy, only in the future period. This introduces inter-generational externalities, whose consequences will be addressed in Subsection 3.6.
The dynamics of our model are now given by:
where, for the sake of simplicity, w t and Q t are assumed to be not only exogenous but also constant, so that w t = w and Q t = Q.
This kind of dynamics results from the two-sided feedback between life expectancy and the environment, described by m t = m(π t ) and π t = π(e t ), respectively. In this framework, a steadystate equilibrium is defined as a fixed point e * such that φ(e * ) = e * , which is stable (unstable) if
Depending on the shape of the transition function φ(e t ), we may have different scenarios. Figure 3 shows that we have only one stable steady-state as long as φ(·) is concave for all possible values of e t . From equation (9) we can infer that the steady-state value of environmental quality e * (and consequently life expectancy π * ) is positively affected by income w (through the effectiveness of maintenance, σ) and preferences for the environment (γ), while it is negatively influenced by the external effect λQ and the natural rate of deterioration η.
Non-ergodicity and multiple steady-states may instead occur if φ(·) displays one or more inflection points, being for instance first convex and then concave. In this case, depending on initial conditions, an economy may end up with either high or low environmental quality: e * H and e * L , respectively (see Figure 3) . A transition function φ(e t ) compatible with the existence of multiple equilibria might be generated by a variety of functional forms describing the survival probability π(e t ). In particular, a step-function approximation of a convex-concave π (e t ) is convenient to get analytical results. 8 8 Notice that, however, the existence of multiple equilibria is not constrained by assuming a convex-concave π(e t ). 
An analytical illustration
The possibility of multiple equilibria implies the existence of an environmental poverty trap. To give an analytical illustration of such a case, we introduce now the following specific functional form relating the survival probability to inherited environmental conditions:
where π > π, andẽ is an exogenous threshold value of environmental quality, above (below) which the value of the survival probability is high (low). The value ofẽ may depend on factors such as medicine effectiveness, health care quality, etc. For instance, a lowẽ can be explained by a very efficient medical technology that makes long life expectancy possible even in a deteriorated environment. A highẽ might instead represent the case of a developing country, where health services are so poorly performing that mortality remains high even under pretty good environmental conditions.
Given equation (10), the transition function φ(e t ) becomes:
We can then claim the following:
Proposition 1 If the following condition holds:
then the dynamic equation (11) Proof. Provided that it exists, any steady-state is stable since φ (e t ) < 1, ∀e t > 0. Multiplicity
, which yields the condition above.
In particular, we have that:
As shown by Figure 4 , the threshold valueẽ identifies a poverty trap: an economy starting between 0 andẽ will reach the equilibrium point A, which is a steady-state characterized by both low environmental quality (e * L ) and short life expectancy (pinned down to π). In fact, a lower survival probability induces agents to substitute environmental maintenance with consumption.
However, if initial conditions are such that e 0 ≥ẽ, the economy will end up in the higher steadystate B, where longer life expectancy (π) is associated with a healthier environment (e * H ).
In and out of the trap
The very existence of an environmental trap implies that some countries (or regions) may experience, over time, both environmental degradation and decay in life expectancy. Cross-section Let us now go back to our formal framework and assume that our economy is initially trapped in the low steady-state (A, in Figure 4 ) characterized by (e * L , π ). We can identify three different ways of escaping this trap: (i) a large enough permanent reduction in the threshold valueẽ, (ii) a parallel shift-up of the function φ(e t ), and (iii) an increase of the slope of φ(e t ). The first one, as already seen, might correspond to improvements in medicine. 11 The second may 10 Most of them are African or ex-Soviet countries. Losses in longevity are sometimes severe, going up to [15] [16] [17] [18] years, and "in several West African countries, (they) are not obviously attributable to HIV/AIDS". 11 In de la Croix and Sommacal (2008), advances in medicine, through a longer life expectancy, promote capital be induced by a permanent income expansion and/or reduction of harmful external effects. 12 .
The third one may be instead explained by a permanent rise of π that, similar to a reduction of e, can be traced back to technological progress in medical sciences, etc. Whatever the case, e * L would be associated with a greater concern about the future, implying more maintenance, less consumption, and finally convergence to the high (and now unique) steady-state B defined by (e * H , π ).
Intuitively, all the above channels may work in the opposite direction: a reduction in w and/or an increase in Q may lead to the elimination of the high steady-state and an economy, which would have otherwise ended up there, can be thrown back in the poverty trap. Even temporary shocks (such as natural disasters or episodes of acute pollution) may be sufficient to fall in the trap. This raises a concern about the environmental awareness of countries. Neglecting environmental care and a bad management of natural resources may make countries vulnerable to even temporary events with serious long-lasting consequences for human development. Furthermore, some countries might find themselves trapped if they meet environmental constraints when life expectancy is still low. This could be the case of those African countries that display a low life expectancy, but are already very polluted.
Welfare analysis
In our model, agents are outlived by the consequences of their environmental choices and are not able to internalize the external effects of these choices on future generations. It would then be interesting to compare such a decentralized equilibrium with a "green" golden rule allocation, as defined by Chichilnisky et al. (1995) . This means solving the model from the point of view of a social planner, whose objective is to maximize aggregate utility at the steady-state. The case of a full-fledged forward-looking planner, who also cares about generations along the transition path and thus develops an optimal inter-temporal plan, will be analyzed in Appendix A.
As in John and Pecchenino (1994), we then look for the optimal steady-state combination of consumption and environmental quality that maximizes U(c, e), subject to:
which summarizes the budget and the environmental constraints, at the steady-state.
accumulation and growth. In our setting, they induce a different kind of investment, i.e. environmental maintenance. 12 A possible real world example of a smaller Q could be the implementation of international agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol. Notice that even a temporary reduction in Q can help leaving the trap. In this case, however, escaping from the trap does not imply the elimination of the lower steady-state.
The resulting optimality condition is given by:
Comparing (14) with (4) at the steady-state, we can see immediately that the golden rule allocation does not coincide with the decentralized equilibrium, since (i) η < 1, and (ii) ∂π/∂e = 0. In fact, as soon as there are intergenerational externalities linked to environmental quality (as an argument of the utility function and as a factor affecting life expectancy), individual agents consume more (and invest less in maintenance) than it would be socially optimal. We can then claim the following:
Proposition 2 At the steady-state, a decentralized equilibrium involves lower environmental quality than the green golden rule allocation.
The "distance" between the decentralized and the golden rule values of e is inversely related to η, while it is increasing in ∂π/∂e . At the limit, as η tends to 1 and ∂π /∂e tends to 0, the effect of environmental care on the future state of the environment and life expectancy vanishes, thus eliminating inter-generational externalities. Therefore, the decentralized solution approaches the golden rule allocation.
In order to achieve an optimal allocation in the decentralized economy, environmental policies can be implemented. Consider for instance a tax levied on consumption, so that its price becomes (1 + τ ) (instead of 1): given the structure of our model, this boils down to taxing pollution. Tax receipts will be then transferred in a lump-sum way to agents. 13 If this is the case, decentralized agents define their optimal choices according to:
Equating (14) and (15), we can deduce the tax rate that realizes the optimal allocation:
It can be noticed that the smaller the size of external effects, the lower the environmental tax.
In addition, τ * depends positively on β (which magnifies, through the pollution term in (3), the intergenerational externality), and negatively on σ (which, defining the effectiveness of maintenance, reduces the size of negative external effects).
In order to get some further insight, we specify the utility function as in (1) and the survival probability π as in (10) , so that ∂π/∂e = 0. 14 We can accordingly determine the following 13 Our analysis would hold qualitatively unaffected, if taxes were used to subsidize maintenance. 14 Therefore, one of the two externalities disappears and the tax rate in (16) simplifies into τ * = (1 − η)(β +σ)/(ησ).
"golden" value for environmental quality:
which can be compared to the case of a decentralized economy producing multiple equilibria (as defined by e * L and e * H in (12)). Let us now describe the dynamics of the model, under the social planner and in the private case, respectively. In Figure 5 , we draw as a solid line the transition function for the decentralized economy, while the dotted line represents the dynamic evolution of e under the social planner hypothesis. Depending on the value ofẽ, we may have two different scenarios. Ifẽ is sufficiently larger than e * L , as in Figure 5a , then there will also be two golden rule allocations, each one superior to the corresponding competitive equilibrium. If insteadẽ is close enough to e * L (ẽ in Figure 5b ), then there exists a unique green golden rule allocation; in this case we may say that the social planner eliminates the lower steady-state, thus driving the economy out of the trap. 15 15 Whether the social planner circumvents the poverty trap depends crucially on the shape of the π(·) function.
Suppose to have, for instance, a low π and/or a highẽ in (10) : in this case, although the planner's optimality condition (14) implies less consumption and more maintenance (with respect to the decentralized economy), this does not necessarily translate into a higher survival probability (π), at the steady-state.
Introducing human capital accumulation
In the basic version of our model, income was completely exogenous in every period and we did not allow for any growth mechanism. In this Section, we aim at overcoming this limitation by introducing human capital accumulation through education. We want to capture three rather simple ideas: (i) environmental preservation subtracts some resources not only from consumption but also from investment, (ii) income growth, relaxing the budget constraint, makes more maintenance possible, and (iii) growth might itself involve some pollution. 16 A complementary analysis, with investment concerning physical capital instead of human capital, will be developed in Appendix B.
Structure of the model
Agents maximize the following utility function:
where, with respect to (1), we have introduced explicitly inter-generational altruism. Parents care about the human capital level attained by their children (h t+1 ), and the importance attached to this term is measured by α ∈ (0, 1). Inter-generational altruism is eventually magnified (reduced) by a higher (lower) π t : the success (or failure) of their children will affect relatively more those parents who will live long enough to witness it. Once more, for the sake of simplicity, we neglect inter-temporal discounting, so that the preference for the future is completely defined by the survival probability. As it was in the basic model, an increased survival probability implies also that agents put more value on future environmental quality.
The production of a homogeneous good takes place according to the following function:
where w, which we assume to stay constant over time, is both an index of productivity and the wage rate; h t is also aggregate human capital, once we normalize to one the population of our economy. As before, fertility is exogenous, constant and such that there is no population growth. 16 Ikefuji and Horii (2007) also have a model with poverty-environment traps related to human capital. However, life expectancy plays no role in their framework. Moreover, since they do not allow for maintenance, they are not able to consider a trade-off between investment and environmental preservation. Finally, in their model higher human capital necessarily implies lower pollution, thus neglecting that growth itself is potentially polluting.
The budget constraint writes as:
Agents are paid w for each unit of human capital. Available income may be employed for three alternative purposes: current consumption (c t ), environmental maintenance (m t ) and educational investment (v t ). More precisely, v t denotes the total amount of education bought by parents for their children, assuming that education is privately funded.
Education is pursued by parents because it can be transformed into future human capital according to the following function:
where, depending on θ ∈ (0, 1), "nature" (parental human capital h t ) complements "nurture" (v t )
in the accumulation of productive skills. Notice that δ > 0 accounts for total factor productivity in education, while the parameter µ > 0 prevents human capital from being zero even if parents do not invest in education, as in de la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004) .
Agents engage in maintenance because it helps to improve future environmental quality, according to:
This formulation reproduces (3), with two exceptions: we have now added a factor accounting for growth-induced pollution (through the coefficient ψ > 0), while the term representing external effects has been removed for ease of presentation. Since here, differently from the benchmark model, we have introduced explicitly a production function, it seems reasonable to consider that such production can also, to some extent, affect environmental conditions. Therefore, we have now two potential sources of pollution: consumption and production. As in the real world, both consumers and firms are susceptible to degrading the environment. We assume for the moment ψ < σ, thus implying that the environmental benefit produced by one unit of maintenance is larger than the environmental damage caused by one unit of production. This looks sensible, since maintenance is completely dedicated to improving the environment, while production generates pollution only as a "by-product".
Optimal choices
Maximizing (18) subject to (20) , (21), (22), c t > 0, m t > 0, e t > 0 and h t > 0, leads to the following optimal choices:
First of all, it is interesting to compare (23) with (5): the negative association between maintenance and current environmental quality still holds, as well as the positive effect of income, which is now related to current human capital. All other things being equal, human capital accumulation makes more income available for environmental care. Of course, investment in maintenance is negatively affected by α, reflecting the relative substitutability between future human capital and future environmental quality in the utility function. Finally, the positive effect of life expectancy on environmental maintenance is confirmed, provided that:
as it can be inferred from:
Condition (26), which we assume to hold henceforth, requires that the preference for environmental quality and the effectiveness of maintenance (γ and σ, respectively) must be strong enough to compensate for the weight attached to education (both in the utility function, through α, and in human capital formation, through (1 − θ)), and the detrimental effect of consumption on the environment (β).
Parental investment in education depends positively on both human capital (because of the traditional income effect and the inter-generational externality in education) and current environmental quality. If the latter is good enough, requiring a smaller investment in maintenance, it frees resources that can be allocated to education. Moreover, as expected, longer life expectancy induces a stronger investment in human capital. 17 In fact, provided that ψ < σ, the following derivative is always positive:
Based on equations (27) and (28), a positive correlation between life expectancy and both environmental quality and human capital arises, along the transition path.
Dynamics
By replacing (23)- (25) into (21) and (22), we get the following non-linear system of two difference equations, which describes the dynamics of our economy:
In this set-up, a steady-state equilibrium is defined as a fixed point (h * , e * ) such that ξ(h * , e * ) = h * and ζ(h * , e * ) = e * . To build an analytical example, we assume, similar to Section 3, the following functional form for the survival probability:
with κ, J > 0. This formulation captures the substitutability (accounted for by κ) between human capital and environmental quality in increasing life expectancy. Notice also that J is an exogenous threshold value. In Section 3, we have explained how environmental conditions could improve longevity. However, now we also assume that each agent's probability of survival is positively related to her own human capital. Such a mechanism has already been exploited, for instance, Equation (31) paves the way to the existence of multiple steady-states, i.e. multiple solutions to the system composed by (29) and (30) . After defining the two loci HH ≡ {(h t , e t ) : h t+1 = h t }
and EE ≡ {(h t , e t ) : e t+1 = e t }, we can claim the following:
proper conditions on the threshold value J hold, and (iii) the slope of HH is larger than the slope of EE, then there exist two stable steady-states A and B such that 0 < h * A < h * B and 0 < e * A < e * B .
Proof. See Appendix C
In particular, the high equilibrium is characterized by:
while, to obtain the low equilibrium (h * A , e * A ), we just need to replace π with π in the above expressions. Notice that wδ 1/(1−θ) < σ /(σ − ψ) is a sufficient condition for both steady-state values to be strictly positive.
It can be shown that the steady-state values of both environmental quality and human capital are positively affected by π and w, provided that ψ < σ. Concerning the other parameters, it is interesting to underline that e * depends positively on θ: the more important is nature (with respect to nurture) in human capital formation, the more parents will be likely to invest in maintenance (rather than in education). Obviously, α and γ also influence positively the long-run levels of both human capital and environmental care. All these findings do not depend on the multiplicity of equilibria, and would apply to the case of a unique steady-state as well.
Let us now give a quick description of the behavior of our dynamical system. An economy starting from low (high) enough environmental quality and parental human capital, so that e 0 + κh 0 < J (≥ J), will end-up in the steady-state equilibrium A (B), which is characterized by both low (high) environmental quality and human capital and short (longer) life expectancy. Such a situation is represented by the phase diagram in Figure 6 .
The causal relationship linking the survival probability to both environmental quality and human capital implies the possibility of a country being stuck in a poverty trap, as in the benchmark model, and the underlying mechanism is quite similar. However, the trap is now characterized by three elements, namely low levels of: (i) environmental quality, (ii) life expectancy, and (iii) human capital. 18 By consequence, differently from Section 3, an economy initially trapped in the inferior steady-state can get out of it also through exogenous factors or policies that are related to human capital. We may think of, amongst others, the introduction of public schooling or educational subsidies, or an exogenous increase in the productivity of the schooling system (δ). In Figure 6 , the latter would correspond to a repositioning of the EE and HH loci, such that (h 0 , e 0 ) may fall in the basin of attraction of B instead of A.
Finally, we would emphasize that the dynamics represented in the above diagram are also consistent with the so-called environmental Kuznets curve (Grossman and Krueger, 1995 ). An economy starting with low human capital and a fairly good environmental quality, will first experience a deterioration of environmental conditions as it develops, but will then see its environment improving for further stages of growth.
Welfare analysis
Here we want to find the green golden rule allocation and compare it with the equilibrium of the decentralized economy, where agents do not internalize the effects of their actions on the welfare of following generations. We will proceed as we did in Section 3, by solving, at the steady-state, the problem of a social planner who treats all generations symmetrically and strives to maximize aggregate utility.
Therefore, we look for the optimal steady-state combination of consumption, environmental quality and human capital that maximizes:
subject to:
Notice that (35) and (36) are, respectively, the budget and the environmental constraints at the steady-state, while (37) is the stationary production function for human capital.
Eliminating m and v, and solving for c, we obtain:
After replacing c in the utility function, we can solve the system made of the two first-order conditions ∂U/∂e = 0 and ∂U/∂h = 0 to obtain:
where, consistently with our analytical example, π can be either π or π. We are ensured that this solution represents a maximum since: ∂ 2 U/∂e 2 < 0 and ∂ 2 U/∂h 2 < 0. After comparing e g with e * , we can claim the following:
Proposition 4 At the steady-state, for sufficiently low values of η, the decentralized equilibrium involves lower environmental quality than the green golden rule allocation. Moreover, under proper conditions, the social planner solution may imply the elimination of the environmental trap.
In particular, we need η <η, where:
Provided that the conditions mentioned in Proposition 3 hold,η is positive. In addition, for α tending to 0,η tends to 1, thus reproducing the case analyzed in Section 3. This is not surprising, since α represents the weight of human capital in the utility function.
Moreover, depending on how close the decentralized low steady-state is to J, there is the possibility that the golden rule allocation is unique. In other words, a social planner who internalizes inter-generational externalities might be able to drive the economy out of the trap.
Finally, let us point out that the socially optimal allocation can be decentralized by means of suitable tax/subsidy policies of the kind we have studied in Section 3. The main findings (in terms, for instance, of optimal environmental taxation) would not be different from the benchmark model. However, since further sources of externalities (related to human capital) are now present, additional instruments would be needed.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the interplay between life expectancy and the environment, and the resulting dynamic implications. The basic mechanism, upon which our theoretical model is built, is very simple. On the one hand, environmental quality depends on life expectancy, since agents who expect to live longer have a stronger concern for the future and therefore invest more in environmental care. On the other hand, longevity is affected by environmental conditions. By modeling environmental quality as an asset that can be accumulated over time, we have shown that life expectancy and environmental dynamics can be jointly determined. Eventually, multiple equilibria may arise, defining an environmental kind of poverty trap characterized by both low life expectancy and poor environmental performance. Both the correlation between environment and longevity, and possible non-ergodic dynamics, are consistent with stylized facts.
Our model is also robust to the introduction of a very simple growth mechanism via human capital accumulation. If education depends on life expectancy, and survival probabilities are affected by both environmental quality and human capital, we show that the positive dynamic correlation between longevity and environmental quality is preserved, and extends to income (in the long-run).
Moreover, our welfare analysis suggests that decentralized equilibria are inefficient. Agents do not internalize the effects of their choices on future generations. A social planner who takes these inter-generational externalities into account might achieve a superior equilibrium. We also show that the optimal allocation can be decentralized by means of appropriate environmental policies.
Finally, as interesting extensions and possible directions for further research, we would suggest: (i) to introduce heterogeneity among agents, moving from a representative agent set-up to a political economy model, where environmental choices are determined through voting; (ii) to enhance the demographic part of the model, allowing for endogenous fertility and relating environmental quality to demographic factors other than longevity (population density, for instance);
(iii) to explore alternative policy options suitable for restoring optimality.
Appendices

A Optimality of the dynamics
Let us now consider a full-fledged, forward-looking social planner, who seeks to maximize a social welfare function including all generations (both at the steady-state and along the transition path). The Lagrangian for this problem is:
where λ t+1 is the Lagrangian multiplier, corresponding to the shadow price of environmental quality and ν ∈ (0, 1) accounts for inter-temporal discounting. From the two f.o.c.'s (∂L/∂c t = 0 and ∂L/∂e t+1 = 0), we obtain the following optimality condition:
Comparing the above expression with (4), we see that for the decentralized equilibrium to be socially optimal, we would need:
which never holds, unless ∂π t+1 /∂e t+1 = 0 and η = 1. Equation (A.3) allows us to identify two different inter-generational externalities, both related to m t . The first term accounts for the effect of maintenance on the survival probability of future generations; the second one is due to the direct effect of maintenance on future environmental quality.
As in Section 3, inefficiencies can be corrected by means of environmental taxes. Since both externalities are related to the same source (maintenance), it turns out that one policy instrument is sufficient to achieve optimality. If τ t is the tax rate on consumption at time t, decentralized agents allocate their resources according to:
Therefore, by equating (A.2) and (A.4), and solving for τ t , we get the optimal tax trajectory:
It can be easily checked that the intensity of taxation depends on the size of the inter-generational external effects, ∂π t+1 /∂e t+1 and (1 − η), respectively. Concerning the other parameters, it should be noticed that a higher ν, implying a greater concern for future generations, requires the tax rate to be heavier, while the effect of β and σ is as in Subsection 3.6.
B Physical capital
Here, we want to show that our benchmark model is robust to the introduction of physical capital. Since the latter is built on savings, the optimization problem of our representative agent needs to be modified. The utility function is now:
U t (c t , c t+1 , e t+1 ) = log c t + π t (ρ log c t+1 + γ log e t+1 ), (A.6) where ρ ∈ (0, 1), which might be eventually set equal to (1 − γ), measures the preference for future consumption. The first-period budget constraint becomes:
so that we explicitly introduce savings (s t ) in our analysis. Savings will be used to finance future consumption, according to:
where R t+1 denotes the interest factor at time t + 1. As pointed out by Chakraborty (2004) , the above expression is also consistent with the assumption of a perfect annuity market, and takes into account that agents are not sure to survive to their third period of life. In fact, they are perfectly aware that only with a probability π t , they will be able to enjoy their current savings as future consumption.
To determine the factor prices w t and R t+1 , we can introduce a neo-classical production function that, in per-capita terms, can be simply written as y t = f (k t ).
Investment is made out of savings; the law of motion for the stock of physical capital writes as:
where ι ∈ (0, 1] is the depreciation rate of capital.
The dynamics of environmental quality are described by:
with > 0. With respect to equation (3), we have added the k t term to take into account that also the use of capital in production, and not only consumption, is potentially polluting.
In this economy, individual agents select m t and s t (and implicitly define an optimal intertemporal consumption plan), so as to maximize U t (c t , c t+1 , e t+1 ) subject to (A.7), (A.8) and (A.10).
Their optimizing behavior implies, in general terms:
along with (4). If we take the logarithmic utility function (A.6) and use (A.8), we obtain:
Abstracting from corner solutions, optimal choices are thus given by: 14) and
It can be noticed that investments in environmental care m t depend positively on the existing stock of physical capital, through two different channels: the first one is related to more pollution ( k t ) requiring more maintenance, while the second one accounts for a straightforward income effect (since w t = w(k t )). Conversely, investment in physical capital (savings) is an increasing function of environmental quality, due to a substitution effect: a healthier environment needs less maintenance, thus freeing resources for alternative purposes.
In the long-run, this kind of interplay translates into a positive correlation between the stationary values of capital and environmental quality. In fact, combining (A.9) and (A.12), we obtain γισk * = ρe * . It is then clear that, for instance, as soon as multiple equilibria become possible (depending on the shape of π (e t )), the corresponding poverty trap will be characterized by low levels of life expectancy and both environmental quality and physical capital.
Once we replace optimal choices (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15) into (A.9) and (A.10), and consider that w t = f (k t ) − k t f (k t ), we can compute the steady-state values for environmental quality and physical capital. Take for instance a Cobb-Douglas production function, such that y t = Bk χ t (with χ ∈ (0, 1) and B > 0), and assume a survival probability function as in (10). The steady-state level(s) of physical capital would then be given by:
(A.16)
The stationary value(s) for environmental quality can be accordingly determined, using e * = (γισ/ρ)k * .
C Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is organized as follows. We will first characterize the two loci HH and EE, and then analyze the existence, multiplicity and stability of the steady-states. Let us now recall the definitions of the two loci: HH ≡ {(h t , e t ) : h t+1 = h t } and EE ≡ {(h t , e t ) : e t+1 = e t }.
C.1 Locus HH
From equation (29) we get that h t+1 − h t = ξ(h t , e t ) − h t , where π t is given by equation (31) .
Therefore, the locus HH writes as: where π t = π (= π) for e t + κh t < J (≥ J). As we can see in Figure 6 , locus HH is a discontinuous function divided into two parts (both straight lines) by e t = J − κh t . Its intersection with the y-axis is given by e t HH | h t =0 = −σµ/(1 − µ) < 0, while its slope can be expressed as: (A.18) where π t = π (= π) for e t + κh t < J (≥ J). Indeed, as it is clear from the above equation, for s h to be positive, we just need to have a positive numerator. Moreover, one can also verify that ∂s h (π)/∂π < 0. This implies that the first portion of the locus HH (given by s h (π)) is steeper than the second one (s h (π)), as depicted in Figure 6 .
C.2 Locus EE
Equation (30) yields e t+1 − e t = ζ(h t , e t ) − e t , where π t is given by equation (31) . Therefore, the locus EE can be written as: .19) where π t = π (= π) for e t + κh t < J (≥ J). Like HH, the locus EE is also a discontinuous function divided in two different parts (once more straight lines) by e t = J − κh t . Moreover:
while the slope of EE is given by:
∂e t ∂h t = − γ(σ − ψ)wπ t γ(1 − η)π t − {1 + [α(1 − θ) + γ]π t } ≡ s e (π t ), (A.20) where, as usual, π t = π (= π) for e t + κh t < J (≥ J). One can easily observe that the denominator of the previous equation is strictly negative. Therefore, e t EE | h t =0 > 0 and, provided that σ > ψ, s e > 0. Moreover, since ∂(e t EE | h t =0 )/∂π > 0, the y-intercept corresponding to π t = π is larger than the one defined by π t = π. Finally, we also have ∂s e (π)/∂π > 0, for σ > ψ. Consequently, the slope of the first portion of the locus EE (given by s e (π)) is smaller than the slope of the second part (s e (π)), as represented in Figure 6 .
C.3 Existence, multiplicity and stability of steady-states
Provided that s h > s e and σ > ψ, there exist two points A ≡ (h A , e A ) = EE(π) ∩ HH(π) and B ≡ (h B , e B ) = EE(π) ∩ HH(π), such that 0 < h A < h B and 0 < e A < e B . A and B are both steady-states if e A + κh A < J < e B + κh B . Figure 6 provides a straightforward illustration of this condition: the dashed line e t + κh t = J should lie between A and B.
Let us now study the stability of A and B. Consider first the locus HH, and take a point (h, e) ∈ HH. For a fixed e t = e, and using (A.17), the dynamics of h t are described by: where π t = π (= π) for e t + κh t < J (≥ J). If s h > s e , then the numerator of equation (A.18) is positive, since s e > 0. Consequently, we can verify that, for h t > h (< h), ∆h t < 0 (> 0). Hence, h t decreases (increases). Similarly, let us now consider a point (h, e) ∈ EE. For a fixed h t = h, and taking (A.19), the dynamics of e t are given by the following expression: 22) where π t = π (= π) for e t + κh t < J (≥ J). Since the numerator is negative, it is clear that, for e t > e (< e), ∆e t < 0 (> 0). Hence, e t decreases (increases).
